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T
here is considerable interest in determining whether monetary policy
actions taken by the Federal Reserve under ChairmanAlan Greenspan
can be summarized by a Taylor rule. The original Taylor rule relates
thefederalfundsratetargettotwoeconomicvariables: laggedinﬂationandthe
outputgap,withtheactualfederalfundsratecompletelyadjustingtothetarget
in each period (Taylor 1993).1 The later assumption of complete adjustment
has often been interpreted as indicating the policy rule is “non-inertial,” or
the Federal Reserve does not smooth interest rates. Inﬂation in the original
Taylor rule is measured by the behavior of the GDP deﬂator and the output
gap is the deviation of the log of real output from a linear trend. Taylor (1993)
shows that from 1987 to 1992 policy actions did not differ signiﬁcantly from
prescriptions of this simple rule. Hence, according to the original Taylor rule,
the Federal Reserve, at least during the early part of the Greenspan era, was
backward looking, focused on headline inﬂation, and followed a non-inertial
policy rule.
Recent research, however, suggests a different picture of the Federal Re-
serve under Chairman Greenspan. English, Nelson, and Sack (2002) present
evidence that indicates policy actions during the Greenspan period are better
explained by an “inertial” Taylor rule reﬂecting the presence of interest rate
smoothing.2 Blinder and Reis (2005) state that the Greenspan Fed focused on
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1 Taylor (1993) did not estimate the policy rule but chose speciﬁc values for the policy
response coefﬁcients, the real rate, and the inﬂation target.
2 English, Nelson, and Sack (2002) provide empirical evidence for the hypothesis that the
Greenspan Fed smoothed interest rates. Woodford (2005) suggests the Federal Reserve under
Greenspan, in fact, communicated its interest-smoothing intentions to ﬁnancial markets by includ-
ing descriptive, forward-looking sentences in its policy statements to ensure that policy expectations
of the ﬁnancial sector remain aligned with its own outlook for policy. For example, in order to230 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
a “core” measure of inﬂation in adjusting its federal funds rate target. Clarida,
Gal´ ı, and Gertler (2000), among others, have shown that a forward-looking
Taylor rule that relates the current funds rate target to “expected” inﬂation and
output developments appears to ﬁt the data quite well over the period span-
ning the tenures of Chairmen Paul Volcker and Alan Greenspan. Orphanides
(2001) argues that policy evaluations using policy rules estimated with the
ﬁnal revised data may be misleading.
This article estimates a Taylor rule that address three key features of the
Greenspan period highlighted in recent research: the Federal Reserve under
Greenspan was forward looking, focused on core inﬂation, and smoothed
interest rates. Furthermore, this article uses the real-time data for economic
variables and investigates whether results based on the ﬁnal, revised data
change when the real-time data are used. We also examine whether the use





t = α0 + αππc
t,j + αy(ln yt,k − ln y∗
t,k), (1.1)
FRt = ρFRt−1 + (1 − ρ)FR∗
t + vt, (1.2)
FRt = ρFRt−1 + (1 − ρ){α0 + αππc
t,j (1.3)
+αy(ln yt,k − lny∗
t,k)}+vt,
where FRt is the actual federal funds rate, FR∗
t is the federal funds rate
target, πc
t,j is the j-period ahead forecast of core inﬂation made at time t,
ln y is the log of actual output, ln y∗ is the log of potential output, and vt
is the disturbance term. Thus, the term (ln yt,k− ln y∗
t,k) is the k-period
ahead forecast of the output gap. Equation (1.1) relates the federal funds
rate target to expected values of two economic fundamentals: core inﬂation
and the output gap. The funds rate target is hereafter called the policy rate.
The coefﬁcients απ and αy measure the long-term responses of the funds
rate target to the expected inﬂation and the output gap. They are assumed to
be positively signed, indicating that the Federal Reserve raises its funds rate
deal with the threat of deﬂation in 2003, policy statements in that year included sentences such
as “...policy accommodation can be maintained for a considerable period of time,” meaning the
Federal Reserve would not raise its funds rate target in response to increases in real growth given
the threat of deﬂation. The intent was to hold long-term interest rates low by quashing expec-
tations that the Fed was on the verge of increasing the funds rate. In 2004, policy statements
included phrases such as “...the Committee believes that it can be patient in removing policy
accommodation,” and “...the Committee believes that policy accommodation can be removed at
a pace that is likely to be measured.” The latter came to mean 25 basis points at each FOMC
meeting. These considerations suggest the Greenspan policy rule should be estimated allowing for
the presence of interest-rate smoothing. Blinder and Reis (2005) also argue that the Greenspan
Fed used frequent small changes in the funds rate to hit its target for the policy rate suggested
by economic fundamentals such as inﬂation and unemployment.Y. P. Mehra and B. D. Minton: Taylor Rule and the Greenspan Era 231
target if inﬂation rises and/or the output gap is positive. Equation (1.2) is the
standard partial adjustment equation, expressing the current funds rate as a
weighted average of the current funds rate target FR∗
t and last quarter’s actual
value FRt−1. If the actual funds rate adjusts to its target within each period,
then ρ equals zero, which suggests that the Federal Reserve does not smooth
interest rates. Equation (1.2) also includes a disturbance term, indicating that
in the short run, the actual funds rate may deviate from the value implied by
economic determinants speciﬁed in the policy rule. If we substitute equation
(1.1) into (1.2), we get (1.3), a forward-looking “inertial” Taylor rule.3
This article estimates the Taylor rule (1.3) using ﬁnal as well as real-time
data. The real-time data consists of the Greenbook forecasts of core CPI
inﬂation and the Congressional Budget Ofﬁce (CBO) estimates of the output
gap.4 ThepolicyruleestimatedusingtheﬁnaldatacoversalloftheGreenspan
periodfrom1987:1to2005:4,whereastheruleestimatedusingtheGreenbook
forecasts spans part of the Greenspan period from 1987:1 to 2000:4, given the
ﬁve-year lag in release of the Greenbook forecasts to the public.5
The empirical work presented here suggests several conclusions. First,
policy response coefﬁcients in theestimated inertial Taylor rule (απ,αy,ρ)
are all positively signed and statistically signiﬁcant. The key points to note
are: (a)theestimatedlong-terminﬂationresponsecoefﬁcientαπ iswellabove
unity, which suggests that the Greenspan Fed responded strongly to expected
inﬂation; (b) the estimated output gap response coefﬁcient αy is generally
belowunity,suggestingthepresenceofarelativelyweakresponsetotheoutput
gap; and (c) the estimated partial adjustment coefﬁcient ρ is well above zero,
indicating the presence of interest-rate smoothing. The conclusion suggested
bytheestimatedTaylorrule,namely,theGreenspanFedrespondedstronglyto
expected inﬂation developments (απ > 1) but relatively weakly to the output
gap (αy < 1), is in line with the recent work by Boivin (2006), who, using a
different estimation methodology, reports time-varying estimates of inﬂation
and the output gap response coefﬁcients from 1970 to 1995. For the period
3As is well known, the constant term in the Taylor rule has embedded in it the Federal
Reserve’s estimates of the short-term real rate and the inﬂation target. For further explantion,
rewrite equation (1.1) of the text as FR∗
t = rr∗ + π∗ + απ(πc
t,j − π∗) + αy(ln yt,k − ln y∗
t,k)
where rr∗is the real rate and π∗ is the inﬂation target. If we substitute the above equation
into equation (1.2) of the text, we get equation (1.3) of the text, where the constant term is
now deﬁned as α0 = rr∗ + (1 − απ)π∗. However, one cannot recover estimates of both rr∗and
π∗without bringing some additional information. See footnote 17.
4 The preferred measure of real economic activity (say, the output gap) should be the one
used in generating the Greenbook forecasts. However, for a major part of the sample period
covered here, the Greenbook has not published estimates of the output gap. Hence, it is quite
common in this literature to estimate the policy rules using the CBO estimates of the output (or
unemployment) gap.
5 We lose observations at the beginning and end of the sample period due to leads and lags
of inﬂation in the policy rule. The effective sample period is 1988:1 to 2004:4.232 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
since the mid-1980s, the reported estimated policy coefﬁcients are stable and
close to values as reported in this article.6
Second, the hypothesis that the Greenspan Fed paid attention to expected
inﬂation and output gap developments is supported by additional test results.
Those tests favor a forward-looking inertial Taylor rule over the one in which
the Federal Reserve focuses on lagged inﬂation and the output gap. Further-
more, the results somewhat support the hypothesis that the Greenspan Fed
was focused on core rather than on headline inﬂation.
Third, the Taylor rule estimated using the Greenbook core CPI inﬂation
forecastsandtheCBO’sestimatesofreal-timeoutputgaphasalowerstandard
error of estimate and predicts policy actions better than the Taylor rule esti-
matedusingactualfutureinﬂationandtheﬁnal,reviseddataontheoutputgap.
However, there still remain several periods during which policy actions differ
signiﬁcantly from prescriptions of the simple Taylor rule. Hence, despite its
better ﬁt, the forward-looking inertial Taylor rule estimated here may not be
considered a complete description of policy actions taken by the Greenspan
Fed.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 1 discusses esti-
mation of the Greenspan policy rule and the real-time data that underlie the
estimated policy rule. Section 2 discusses estimation results, and concluding
observations are in Section 3.
1. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
Estimation of the Forward-Looking Inertial Taylor
Rule
One key objective of this article is to investigate whether monetary policy
actions taken by the Federal Reserve under Chairman Greenspan can be sum-
marized by aTaylor rule according to which the Federal Reserve was forward
looking, focused on core inﬂation, and smoothed interest rates. We model
the forward-looking nature of the policy rule by relating the current value of
the funds rate target to the four-quarter-average expected inﬂation rate and the
contemporaneous output gap. The policy rule incorporating these features is
reproduced below in equation (2.3).
6 In Boivin (2006), the main objective is to investigate whether policy coefﬁcients have
changed over time. For expected inﬂation, the Greenbook forecasts of GNP and GDP deﬂator
are employed. The level of economic activity is proxied using the difference between the natural
unemployment rate and the Greenbook forecast of the unemployment rate. The article, however,
also uses the real-time output gap measure constructed by Orphanides (2001). For the period
1985 to 1995, the point estimates of the long-run inﬂation response coefﬁcients are well above
unity and those for the long-run output gap response coefﬁcient are well below unity.Y. P. Mehra and B. D. Minton: Taylor Rule and the Greenspan Era 233
FRt = ρFR t−1 + (1 − ρ){α0 + αππc




t,4 is the average of one-to-four-quarter-ahead forecasts of core CPI
inﬂation made at time t and other variables as previously deﬁned.7
The estimation of the policy rule in equation (2.3) raises several issues.
The ﬁrst issue relates to how we measure expected inﬂation and the output
gap. The second issue relates to the nature of data used in estimation, namely,
whether it is the real-time or ﬁnal, revised data. As discussed earlier, the
use of revised as opposed to the real-time data may affect estimates of policy
coefﬁcientsandmayprovideamisleadinghistoricalanalysisofpolicyactions
(Orphanides 2001, 2002). The third issue is an econometric one, arising as
a result of the potential presence of serial correlation in the error term vt.
Rudebusch (2006) points out that the Federal Reserve may respond to other
economic factors besides expected inﬂation and the output gap, and hence a
Taylor rule estimated omitting those other factors is likely to have a serially
correlated error term. The presence of serial correlation in the disturbance
term,ifignored,mayspuriouslyindicatethattheFederalReserveissmoothing
interest rates.
To further explain that a serially correlated disturbance term may mistak-
enly indicate the presence of partial adjustment, note ﬁrst that if the funds rate
does partially adjust to the policy rate as shown in (1.2) and the disturbance
term has no serial correlation, then the reduced-form policy rule in (1.3 or
2.3) has the lagged funds rate as one of the explanatory variables. Hence, the
empirical ﬁnding of a signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on the lagged funds rate in the
estimatedpolicyrulemaybeinterpretedasindicatingthepresenceofinterest-
rate smoothing. Now assume that there is no partial-adjustment, ρ = 0i n
(2.3), but instead the disturbance term is serially correlated as shown below
in equation (3.1).
vt = svt−1 + εt, (3.1)
FRt = sFRt−1 +{ α0 + αππc
t,4 + αy(ln yt − ln y∗
t )}
−s{α0 + αππc
t−1,4 + αy(ln yt−1 − ln y∗
t−1)}+εt. (3.2)
If we substitute equation (3.1) into (2.3), it can be easily shown that we get the
reduced-form policy rule in equation (3.2), in which among other variables
lagged funds rate also enters the policy rule. Hence, the empirical ﬁnding of







4 . We have also dropped the subscript 0 in the output gap term (ln
yt,0− ln y∗
t,0).234 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
a signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on the lagged funds rate in the estimated policy rule
may be interpreted arising as a result of interest rate smoothing when in fact,
it is not present. In view of these considerations, this policy rule is estimated
allowingforthepresenceofbothinterestratesmoothingandserialcorrelation,
namely, we allow both partial adjustment and a serially correlated disturbance
term. It can be easily shown that the policy rule incorporating both partial
adjustment and serial correlation can be expressed as in equation (4).
FRt = α0(1 − s)(1 − ρ)+ (s + ρ)FRt−1 + (1 − ρ)
{αππc
t,4 + αy(ln yt − ln y∗
t )}−s{(1 − ρ)αππc
t−1,4
+(1 − ρ)αy(ln yt−1 − ln y∗
t−1)}−sρFRt−2 + εt. (4)
Note that if there is no serial correlation (s = 0 in [4]), we get the reduced-
form policy rule shown in equation (2.3), and if there is no partial adjustment
(ρ = 0 in [4]), we get the policy rule shown in (3.2). Of course, if both s and
ρ are not zero, we have a policy rule with both partial adjustment and serial
correlation.
In previous research, the forward-looking policy rule similar to the one
given in equation (2.3) has often been estimated assuming rational expecta-
tionsandusingageneralizedmethodofmomentsprocedure(Clarida,Gal´ ı,and
Gertler 2000). We follow this literature and estimate the policy rule assuming
rational expectations; namely, we substitute actual future core inﬂation and
actual current output gap for the expected inﬂation and output gap terms and
use an instrumental variables procedure to estimate policy coefﬁcients. How-
ever, we also estimate the policy rule using the Greenbook inﬂation forecasts
as proxy for expected inﬂation. In contrast to previous work, we estimate the
policyruleallowingforthepresenceofbothinterest-ratesmoothingandserial
correlation as in equation (4). We use a nonlinear instrumental variables pro-
cedure when rational expectations are assumed and nonlinear ordinary least
squares procedure when the Greenbook forecasts are used. The instruments
used are three lagged values of inﬂation, the federal funds rate, levels and ﬁrst
differences of the output gap, and the spread between the ten-year Treasury
bond yield and the federal funds rate.
Inpreviouswork,asinBoivin(2006),ordinaryleastsquareshavebeenem-
ployedtoestimatetheTaylorrulethatusestheGreenbookforecasts. However,
the use of ordinary least squares requires the assumption that the Greenbook
forecasts are contemporaneously uncorrelated with the policy shock εt.A s
noted in Boivin (2006), while some casual arguments can be made to support
this assumption,8 they cannot be directly veriﬁed, and hence would not be
8 Reifschneider, Stockton, and Wilcox (1997) provide some information about the condition-
ing assumptions of the Greenbook forecasts over the last ten years. The ﬁrst feature is that these
forecasts are made under the typical assumption that the federal funds rate will remain unchangedY. P. Mehra and B. D. Minton: Taylor Rule and the Greenspan Era 235
enough to convince a skeptic that the Greenbook forecasts may potentially be
correlated with the policy surprise. This correlation may arise if the Green-
bookforecastsreﬂectsomecontemporaneousinformationandtheFOMCalso
reactstosuchinformationbyadjustingthepolicyrate,asarguedinRudebusch
(2006). This endogeneity could introduce some bias in parameter estimates.
In view of this consideration, we check the robustness of our results to the
presence of potential endogeneity, using instrumental variables. In particular,
we also estimate the Taylor rule, using the Greenbook forecasts made in pre-
viousquartersasinstruments. Weﬁndourmainresultsarerobustwithrespect
to this change in the estimation procedure.
Data
We estimate the policy rule in equation (4) over the period from 1987:1 to
2005:4 using the data on core CPI inﬂation and the output gap. For expected
inﬂation, we also use the Greenbook inﬂation forecasts of core CPI inﬂation,
prepared by the Board staff for the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)
meeting held near the second month of the quarter. There is considerable
evidence that the Greenbook forecasts are most appropriate in capturing poli-
cymakers’real-time assessment of future inﬂation developments. Romer and
Romer (2000) show that the Federal Reserve has an informational advantage
over the private sector, producing relatively more accurate forecasts of inﬂa-
tionthandoestheprivatesector. BernankeandBoivin(2003)argueoneneeds
a large set of conditional information to properly model monetary policy. In
that respect, the Greenbook forecasts include real-time information from a
wide range of sources, including the Board staff’s “judgment,” not otherwise
directly measurable. The policy rule that uses the Greenbook forecasts is
estimated over the period from 1988:1 to 2000:4.
Unlike inﬂation forecasts the Board staff’s estimates of the output gap are
not readily available. Here we follow the previous research using estimates
of potential output prepared by the Congressional Budget Ofﬁce (CBO).9
during the next six to eight quarters. This neutral assumption about the path of monetary policy
may reﬂect the desire of the Board staff to avoid being construed as making policy recommen-
dations, suggesting that for most of that period, the forecasts were not conditioned on the policy
surprise. The second feature of these forecasts is a large “judgmental” component, making it hard
for these forecasts to be mechanically reproduced by any particular forecasting model, thereby less-
ening the probability of a contemporaneous correlation between forecasts and the policy surprise.
9 Potential output is deﬁned as trend in the productive capacity of the economy and is esti-
mated by the level of GDP attainable when the economy is operating at a high rate of resource
use. The CBO estimates potential output for the economy, using a production function approach
applied to each of ﬁve major sectors (nonfarm business, government, farm, household and nonproﬁt
institutions, and residential housing) and then aggregating sectoral estimates of potential output. For
example, for the nonfarm business sector CBO uses a neoclassical production function that relates
output produced in that sector to labor (hours worked), capital, and total factor productivity. Po-
tential output in nonfarm business sector is an estimate of output attainable when labor, capital,236 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly





















However, we also construct a real-time series on the output gap using the
CongressionalBudgetestimatesofactualandpotentialoutputseriesavailable
in real time.10 Unlike the data on the output gap, the data on CPI is not
signiﬁcantly revised, and hence we use the 2006 vintage dataset for core CPI.
Figure 1 charts real-time estimates of the output gap from 1987 to 2005.
The most recent vintage (2006) estimates of the output gap are also charted.
The main observation is that the real-time estimates of the output gap are not
too different from their recent vintage estimates with the exception of periods
1990 to 1993 and 1995 to 1998. The real-time estimates of the output gap
during the period surrounding the 1990–1991 recession indicate the presence
of considerably more slack in the economy than what is indicated by current
and total factor productivity variables in the production function are set at their cyclically adjusted
levels (Congressional Budget Ofﬁce 2001).
10 In January of each year from 1991 to 2006, the Congressional Budget Ofﬁce has released
the historical data on actual and potential output. For the period 1987 to 1990, the output gap
is constructed using the series on actual and potential output given in the 1991 vintage data ﬁle.
For 1991, we have used the pertinent series on actual and potential output from the 1992 vintage
data ﬁle and for each year thereafter. So, the potential output estimate for 2005 is constructed
using the data ﬁle released in January 2006.Y. P. Mehra and B. D. Minton: Taylor Rule and the Greenspan Era 237
































estimates. Hence, a policy rule that uses the real-time estimates of the output
gap is likely to prescribe a lower funds rate target than what is indicated
by the use of revised estimates. Similarly, real-time estimates of the output
gap from 1995 to 1998 indicate far less slack in the economy than what is
suggested by the current vintage estimates, due to the ongoing productivity
acceleration that was not recognized by most economists at the time. Hence,
for the subperiod 1995 to 1998 the funds rate target prescribed by the policy
rule with the real-time output gap is higher than what is suggested by the
current vintage estimate of the output gap, ceteris paribus. Given the size of
output gap revisions, policy evaluation is likely to be affected whether one
uses the real-time or revised data on the output gap.
Figure 2 charts the actual and Greenbook forecasts of the four-quarter-
average core CPI inﬂation rate. As shown, the Greenbook forecasts track
actualinﬂationfairlywell,withtheexceptionofperiods,1988:2to1989:2and
1995 to 1997. In both these subperiods, the Greenbook was “too pessimistic”
about future inﬂation. As some analysts have noted, during the ﬁrst subperiod
theBoardstaffmayhaveworriedaboutfutureinﬂationbecausetheGreenspan
Fed had kept interest rates low following the stock market crash of October238 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
1987. During the second subperiod, productivity acceleration was underway,
and most economists, including the Board staff, were slow in recognizing the
favorable effects of productivity acceleration on inﬂation.
2. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
This section presents and discusses estimates of a Taylor rule ﬁtted over the
Greenspan period.
Estimates of Policy Response Coefﬁcients
Table1presentsestimatesofpolicyresponsecoefﬁcients(απ,αy,ρ)fromthe
Taylor rule in equation (4) estimated using the ﬁnal as well as the real-time
data on core CPI inﬂation and the output gap. Row 1 contains estimates de-
rived using the current vintage data on the output gap, whereas row 2 contains
estimates derived using the real-time data on the output gap. Row 3 contains




coefﬁcients are correctly signed and statistically signiﬁcant. In particular, the
inﬂation response coefﬁcient απ is generally well above unity and the output
response coefﬁcient αy is below unity, which suggests that the Greenspan Fed
responded strongly to expected inﬂation and relatively weakly to output.
Second, the estimated serial correlation coefﬁcient s is generally positive
andstatisticallysigniﬁcant,indicatingthepresenceofseriallycorrelatederrors
in the estimated policy rules. As noted in Rudebusch (2006), the presence
of serial correlation may reﬂect inﬂuences on the policy rate of economic
variables to which the Federal Reserve may have responded but which are
omitted from the estimated policy rule.
Third, even after allowing for the presence of serial correlation, the esti-
mated partial adjustment coefﬁcient ρ is positive and well above zero, which
suggests the continued role of partial adjustment in generating a signiﬁcant
coefﬁcientonthelaggedvalueofthefundsrate. Thisresultissimilartothatof
English, Nelson, and Sack (2002). However, the magnitude of the estimated
partial adjustment coefﬁcient ρ reported here is somewhat smaller than what
is found in previous research. As discussed later in this article, the point esti-
mates of the partial adjustment coefﬁcient range from .5 to .7 when theTaylor
rule is alternatively estimated using the Greenbook forecasts of headline CPI
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These estimates indicate a faster convergence of the funds rate to its desired
level over this sample period (see PanelsA and B in Table 3).11
Forward- Versus Backward-Looking Speciﬁcations
ThemaintainedhypothesisinthisarticleisthattheGreenspanFedwasforward
looking,respondingtoexpectedinﬂationratherthanlaggedinﬂation. Asnoted
at the outset, the original Taylor rule relates the actual federal funds rate to
laggedinﬂationandtheoutputgap. Inordertoinvestigatewhichspeciﬁcation
better explains the Greenspan period, we also estimate the backward-looking
speciﬁcation. Rows 4 and 5 in Table 1 contain estimates of policy response
coefﬁcientsfromthisbackward-lookingspeciﬁcation,usingcoreCPIinﬂation
and the real-time data on the output gap. Row 4 reports estimates for the
subperiod 1988:1 to 2000:4, as does row 5 for the complete sample period
1988:1 to 2005:4.
One key feature of the backward-looking speciﬁcations reported in Table
1 is that the estimated inﬂation response coefﬁcient απ is close to or below
unity and not always statistically signiﬁcant. These estimates suggest that
the Greenspan Fed did not respond strongly to inﬂation.12 This conclusion
is in sharp contrast to the one suggested by forward-looking speciﬁcations,
according to which the Greenspan Fed responded strongly to inﬂation.
How does one decide which one of these two alternative speciﬁcations
better describes the Greenspan period? The ﬁrst to note is that the forward-
looking speciﬁcation better ﬁts the data, because the forward-looking speciﬁ-
cationbasedontheGreenbookforecastshasalowerstandarderrorofestimate
than the backward-looking speciﬁcation, (compare SERs across rows 3 and 4
in Table 1). We investigate this issue further by testing the validity of alterna-
tivespeciﬁcations, usingageneralspeciﬁcationthatnestsbothbackward-and
forward-looking speciﬁcations. In particular, consider a general speciﬁcation
11As illustrated in Rudebusch (2006), the typical estimate of the partial adjustment coefﬁcient
ρ for this sample period is .8, suggesting that if in response to changed economic conditions the
Federal Reserve wanted to raise the funds rate by one percentage point, it would raise it by about
20 basis points in the ﬁrst three months and by about 60 basis points after one year. Focusing
on the Taylor rule, which is estimated using Greebook forecasts and real-time data on the output
gap, the mid-point of the estimated range of the partial adjustment coefﬁcient is .6, suggesting the
adjustment of the actual funds rate to its desired level will be complete well before a year. See
also English, Nelson, and Sack (2002), in which the use of real-time data in a forward-looking
policy rule yields an estimate of the partial adjustment coefﬁcient that is also quite low.
12 Blinder and Reis (2005) report a similar ﬁnding. For the period from 1987:3 to 2000:1,
they estimate a Taylor rule that relates the funds rate target to current inﬂation and the unem-
ployment gap. The inﬂation response coefﬁcient estimated during that time is .57, leading them
to conclude that the Greenspan Fed did not respond strongly to inﬂation.Y. P. Mehra and B. D. Minton: Taylor Rule and the Greenspan Era 241
given in equation (5.1).
FR∗
t = a + απGBπc
t,j + αy(ln yt − ln y∗
t ) + απ2πc
t−1 (5.1)
+αy2(ln yt−1 − ln y∗
t−1),
FRt = ρFRt−1 + (1 − ρ)FR∗
t + vt, and (5.2)
vt = svt−1 + εt ,
where all variables are deﬁned as before. Equation (5.1) relates the federal
funds rate target to variables suggested by both the speciﬁcations. The key
assumption underlying the general speciﬁcation (5.1) is that lagged inﬂation
and the output gap may directly inﬂuence the current federal funds rate target,
inadditiontoinﬂuencingitindirectlythroughtheGreenbookinﬂationforecast.
The backward-looking speciﬁcation allows for the direct inﬂuence of lagged
inﬂation and the output gap on the current funds rate target. If απ and αy
are zero in (5.1), we get the backward-looking speciﬁcation, and if απ2 and
αy2 are zero, we get the forward-looking speciﬁcation.
Table 2 contains nonlinear ordinary least squares estimates of policy re-
sponse coefﬁcients from the general policy rule (5) estimated over the period
from 1988:1 to 2000:4. In addition to using the four-quarter-average Green-
book inﬂation forecast, we also report estimates using the one-quarter and
two-quarter-average inﬂation forecasts. As shown, estimated coefﬁcients on
the Greenbook forecast απ and the current output gap αy are correctly signed
andstatisticallysigniﬁcant, whereasestimatedcoefﬁcientsonlaggedinﬂation
απ2 and lagged output gap αy2 are not. The p-value of the null hypothesis that
απ2 andαy2 arezerois.89to.94, leadingtotheconclusionthatthedatafavors
the forward-looking speciﬁcation.13
Robustness Issues: Core Versus Headline Inﬂation




the Greenbook forecasts used ordinary least squares to estimate the Taylor
rule. We now investigate the robustness of our results to a few changes in the
speciﬁcation of the Taylor rule and the choice of the estimation procedure.
Table 3 presents the Taylor rule estimated using the Greenbook forecasts
of three alternative measures of inﬂation: core CPI, headline CPI, and the
GDP implicit deﬂator. The measure of real-time output gap used is from
13 The results do not change if the general speciﬁcation is estimated including current val-
ues of inﬂation and the output gap, instead of lagged values of inﬂation. That is, the estimated
coefﬁcient on expected inﬂation remains signiﬁcant and that on current inﬂation is not.242 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Table 2 Estimates of Policy Response Coefﬁcients From a General
Policy Rule: Core CPI Inﬂation
Row GB Forecasts απ αy ρα π2 αy2 SER R
2 p-value
1 1-q average 1.49 .91 .75 .29 -.1 .284 .97 .89
(1.9) (1.9) (8.4) (.3) (.2)
2 2-q average 1.85 0.86 0.75 .16 -.1 .275 .97 .94
(2.0) (1.9) (8.5) (.1) (.3)
3 4-q average 1.99 0.71 0.72 0.33 -.1 .262 .97 .93
(2.5) (2.0) (8.3) (.3) (.3)
Notes: The coefﬁcients reported are nonlinear least squares estimates of the policy rule
given below in (a) and use the Greenbook forecasts (GB) and real-time data on the output
gap.
FR∗
t = a +απGBπc
t,4 +αy(ln yt−ln y∗
t )+απ2πt−1 +αy2(ln yt−1−ln y∗
t−1), (a.1)
FRt = ρFRt−1 +(1−ρ)FR∗
t +vt, (a.2)
where all variables are deﬁned as in Table 1. Parentheses below coefﬁcients contain t-
values. The p-value reported is for the test of the null hypothesis that απ2 and αy2 are
zero. The sample period is from 1988:1 to 2000:4. We do not report the estimated serial
correlation coefﬁcient, though the equations are estimated assuming the presence of serial
correlation.
the Congressional Budget Ofﬁce and remains the same across these three in-
ﬂation speciﬁcations. Panel A presents ordinary least squares estimates and
Panel B, instrumental variables estimates. For a comparison, Panel C reports
the Taylor rule estimated using actual future inﬂation and the ﬁnal data on
the output gap. The estimates presented in Table 3 indicate three main ob-
servations. First, focusing on the Taylor rule with the Greenbook forecasts,
the hypothesis—the Greenspan Fed responded strongly to expected inﬂation
and relatively weakly to the output gap—is robust with respect to the use of
headline inﬂation forecasts and the instrumental variables procedure. The es-
timated inﬂation response coefﬁcient is well above unity and the output gap
response coefﬁcient is below unity for all three measures of inﬂation. The
instrumentalvariablesestimatesofkeypolicyresponsecoefﬁcientsyieldcon-
clusions that are qualitatively similar to those based on ordinary least squares
estimates (compare estimates across Panels A and B). These results suggest
that the bias in ordinary least squares estimates, introduced as a result of the
potential endogeneity of the Greenbook forecasts, may be very small.
Second,asexpected,theﬁtoftheestimatedTaylorruleasmeasuredbythe
standarderrorofregression(SER)issomewhatworseifinstrumentalvariables
are used. However, the Taylor rule estimated with the Greenbook forecasts
always has a lower standard error of regression than the Taylor rule estimated
using actual future inﬂation and the revised data on inﬂation and on the output
gap (compare the SERs across PanelsA, B, and C).Y. P. Mehra and B. D. Minton: Taylor Rule and the Greenspan Era 243
Table 3 Estimated Taylor Rules
Panel A: Greenbook Forecasts/Ordinary Least Squares
Sample Period Inﬂation α0 απ αy ρs R
2 SER
1988:1–2000:4 Core CPI 0.12 1.7 .64 .69 .35 .98 .257
(0.20) (8.8) (6.4) (13.1) (2.5)
1988:1–2000:4 CPI -0.80 2.1 .81 .74 .46 .98 .253
(0.70) (6.4) (5.5) (14.4) (3.3)
1988:1–2000:4 GDP 0.70 1.9 .66 .66 .45 .98 .252
(1.20) (8.5) (6.5) (10.9) (3.3)
Panel B: Greenbook Forecasts/Instrumental Variables
1988:1–2000:4 Core CPI -0.20 1.8 .62 .60 .45 .98 .270
(0.30) (9.3) (6.6) (6.9) (3.2)
1988:1–2000:4 CPI -1.50 2.3 .78 0.64 .60 .98 .273
(1.20) (6.0) (5.5) (7.8) (4.3)
1988:1–2000:4 GDP 0.29 2.1 .64 .51 .55 .97 .278
(0.40) (9.0) (7.2) (4.5) (4.1)
Panel C: Actual Future Inﬂation/Instrumental Variables
1988:1–2000:4 Core CPI 2.70 1.0 .85 .80 .60 .97 .314
(1.30) (1.5) (1.9) (5.6) (3.2)
1988:1–2000:4 CPI 1.80 1.3 .80 .78 .61 .98 .324
(1.00) (2.2) (2.0) (7.3) (3.4)
1988:1–2000:4 GDP 1.30 1.9 .67 .72 .63 .96 .332
(0.80) (2.9) (1.8) (4.3) (2.7)
Notes: Panels A, B, and C contain nonlinear estimates of policy coefﬁcients from the
policy rule given below in (a). Panels A and B use the Greenbook inﬂation forecasts
and the CBO real-time estimates of the output gap. Panel C uses actual future inﬂation
and the ﬁnal revised data on the output gap.
FRt = ρFRt−1 + (1 − ρ){α0 + αππc
t,4 + αy(ln yt − ln y∗
t )}+vt. (a)
The instruments used are three lagged values of the pertinent inﬂation variable: the fed-
eral funds rate, the output gap (real-time or ﬁnal), the growth gap, and the spread between
nominal yieldson ten-year Treasurybondsandthe federal funds rate. SeenotesinTable 1.
Third, regarding core versus headline inﬂation, the results are mixed.
WhentheGreenbookforecastsareused,instrumentalvariablesestimatesfavor
thecoreCPI,whereasordinaryleastsquaresestimatesfavortheheadlineGDP
inﬂation (compare the SERs across Panels A and B in Table 3). However, as
reported in the next section, when we compare the relative accuracy of the
within-sampledynamicforecastsofthefundsrategeneratedbythesedifferent
Taylor rules, the Taylor rule with core CPI inﬂation forecasts yields slightly
more accurate forecasts of the funds rate than the Taylor rule with headline244 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
inﬂation forecasts, supporting the maintained hypothesis that the Greenspan
Fed was focused on core inﬂation.14
Predicting theActual Path of the Federal Funds Rate
Using the Greenbook Inﬂation Forecasts and the
Real-Time Output Gap
Inordertoevaluatehowwelltheforward-lookinginertialTaylorruleestimated
here predicts actual policy actions, we focus on the policy rule estimated
usingGreenbookcoreCPIinﬂationforecastsandthereal-timeCBOestimates
of the output gap from 1987:4 to 2000:4. For this exercise we focus on
ordinaryleastsquaresestimates. Wecarryoutthisevaluationintwoalternative
ways. According to the inertial Taylor rule estimated here, expected inﬂation
(approximated by Greenbook inﬂation forecasts) and the output gap are two
major determinants of the federal funds rate target. In order to see how well
the actual funds rate is predicted by these two economic fundamentals, we
generatethewithin-sampledynamicpredictionsofthefundsratefrom1987:4





t−1 + (1 −ˆ ρ){ˆ α0 +ˆ απGBπc
t,4 +ˆ αy(ln yt − ln y∗
t )}, (6)
whereFRp isthepredictedfundsrateandothervariablesaredeﬁnedasbefore.
The key feature of the prediction equation (6) is that in generating the current-
quarter predicted value of the funds rate, we use last quarter’s predicted, but
not actual value of the federal funds rate, in addition to using current-period
values of two other economic fundamentals.
Figure3chartsthewithin-sampledynamicpredictionsofthefundsrate.15
Actual values of the funds rate and the prediction errors are also charted. Two
observations need to be highlighted. First, the actual funds rate has generally
moved in the direction suggested by these two economic fundamentals (see
PanelA). Second, the estimated policy rule predicts very well the actual level
ofthefundsrate. Themeanabsoluteerroris.29percentagepointsandtheroot
mean squared error is .40 percentage points. Despite this good ﬁt, however,
there are few periods when the actual funds rate is far away from the value
prescribed by economic fundamentals. Signiﬁcant deviations, at least twice
the root mean squared error, occur in 1988 and 1995 (see Panel B, Figure 3).
14 We did not consider the consumption expenditure deﬂator (PCE) in this comparison, be-
cause the Federal Reserve only recently started focusing on core PCE. In fact, the Greenbook
started producing forecasts of core PCE beginning in 2000, suggesting the Greenspan Fed was
focused on core CPI for most of the period covered.
15 The predictions begin in 1987:4. For generating the prediction for 1987:4, we use the
preceding quarter’s actual funds rate. For later periods, the predicted values are generated using
the preceding period’s predicted value and the current period estimates of expected inﬂation and
the output gap.Y. P. Mehra and B. D. Minton: Taylor Rule and the Greenspan Era 245
Figure 3 Predicting theActual Funds Rate
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Figure 4 charts the static predictions of the federal funds rate, generated
usingthesamepolicyrulebutfeedinginlastquarter’sactualvalueofthefunds
rate as shown below in equation (7).
FR
p
t =ˆ ρFRt−1 + (1 −ˆ ρ){ˆ α0 +ˆ απGBπc
t,4 +ˆ αy(ln yt − ln y∗
t )}. (7)
In static forecasts the current-period forecast of the funds rate is determined,
in part, by the current-period value of the desired policy rate suggested by
economic fundamentals and, in part, by the one-period lagged value of the
actualfundsrate. So,inthestaticexercisethecurrentforecastisinﬂuenced,in
part, by actual policy actions, with the magnitude of the inﬂuence of policy on
the forecast being determined by the size of the partial adjustment coefﬁcient
ˆ ρ. Hence,theactualfundsrateislikelybetterpredictedbystaticthandynamic
forecasts, because the latter are generated ignoring the recent history of actual
funds rate changes.
A visual check of actual values of the funds rate and its static predictions
charted in Figure 4 is consistent with the estimated policy rule. The mean
absolute error is now .20 percentage points and the root mean squared error is246 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 4 Predicting theActual Funds Rate
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.26 percentage points. Panel B charts the residuals. As shown, there are still
a few periods of signiﬁcant deviations. We see deviations at least as large as
twice the root mean squared error occurring in 1988, 1989, 1995, and 1998:4.
Thus, Figures 3 and 4 suggest that the Taylor rule estimated using Greenbook
inﬂation forecasts and the real-time data on the output gap well predict actual
policyactions, withthecaveatthatfewepisodesremainwhentheactualfunds
rate is signiﬁcantly far from what is prescribed by this policy rule.
Using Actual Future Core Inﬂation and the Revised Output
Gap
ItisworthpointingoutthatinthepredictionexercisetheTaylorruleestimated
using the Greenbook inﬂation forecasts and the real-time data on the output
gap predicts actual policy actions better than the Taylor rule estimated using
actualfutureinﬂation(coreCPI)andthecurrentvintageestimateoftheoutput
gap. In particular, we re-estimate the Taylor rule over the period from 1988:1
to 2000:4 and generate the within-sample, static and dynamic predictions
of the funds rate, using the current vintage estimate of the output gap. For
static predictions, the mean absolute error and root mean squared error are
.30 and .37 percentage points, respectively. For dynamic predictions, theY. P. Mehra and B. D. Minton: Taylor Rule and the Greenspan Era 247
corresponding mean absolute error and the root mean squared errors are .72
and .84 percentage points. These prediction errors are substantially higher




more accurate forecasts of the funds rate than those based on the headline in-
ﬂation. Fordynamicpredictionsofthefundsrategeneratedusingalternatively
theTaylorrulesbasedoncoreCPI,CPI,andGDPinﬂationforecasts,themean
absolute errors are .29, .35, and .33 percentage points, respectively. The cor-
responding root mean squared errors are .40, .44, and .41 percentage points.
These summary statistics do favor core CPI, though the Taylor rule based on
GDP inﬂation forecasts is a serious contender.16,17
Policy Residuals: Role ofAdditional Factors in the
Estimated Taylor-Type Rule
As stated above, even though the use of Greenbook inﬂation forecasts and
real-time data on the output gap enables the estimated policy rule to predict
policy actions very well, there remain few periods when the actual funds rate
is signiﬁcantly away from values prescribed by the rule, with signiﬁcant devi-
ationsoccurringin1988, 1989, 1995, and1998:4. Manyanalystscontendthat
16 If the Taylor rules based on the Greenbook forecasts of three alternative measures of
inﬂation—core CPI, CPI, and GDP—are estimated with instrumental variables, then the root mean
squared errors generated by the dynamic prediction exercise are .46, .59, and .49 percentage points,
respectively.
17 It will be interesting to derive an estimate of the Greenspan Fed’s inﬂation target under
the additional assumption that the Fed’s estimate of the short-term real rate can be approximated
by the sample mean of the ex post real yield on three-month Treasury bills over a longer sample
period, the latter deﬁned as the nominal yield minus the lagged value of the four-quarter-average
GDP inﬂation rate. By this metric, the short-term real rate is 1.9 percent if we use the sample
period 1961:1–2005:4, and 2.1 percent if we use only the Greenspan period 1987:1–2005:4. These
calculations suggest it is reasonable to assume that the Greenspan Fed’s estimate of the short-real
rate is approximately 2.0 percent. Given rr∗ = 2.0 percent and given an estimate of the constant
term from the estimated Taylor rule based on the Greenbook forecasts of core CPI inﬂation, the
Greenspan Fed’s inﬂation target calculated using the relationship ˆ α0 = rr∗ +(1−ˆ απ)π∗ → .12 =
2.0 + (1 − 1.7)π∗ is 2.7 percent. The result above—the Greenspan Fed’s inﬂation target is 2.7
percent—may at ﬁrst appear at odds with the 2.0 percent value assumed in the original Taylor rule,
where inﬂation is measured by the behavior of GDP inﬂation. During the Greenspan era, GDP
inﬂation has exhibited a somewhat different trend behavior than the core CPI inﬂation measure.
Using the metric of comparing means, the sample mean of GDP inﬂation rates over 1987:1–
2005:4 is 2.4 percent, which is lower compared with the value 3.0 percent computed using core
CPI inﬂation over the same period. If we were to adjust the inﬂation targets for the presence
of different means, then the Greenspan Fed having an inﬂation target of 2.7 percent based on
the behavior of the core CPI inﬂation measure is equivalent to its having, instead, an inﬂation
target of 2.1 percent based on the GDP inﬂation measure. The latter value is close to 2.0 percent
assumed in the original Taylor rule.248 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
signiﬁcant deviations represent episodes when the Greenspan Fed responded
to a variety of macroeconomic developments that are not included in the sim-
ple policy rule (Blinder and Reis 2005, Rudebusch 2006). To illustrate this
point, consider the following narrative history of those developments.
The ﬁrst episode occurs in 1988 and 1989. Following the stock market
crash of October 1987, the Greenspan Fed kept interest rates low as an insur-
anceagainsttheheightenedriskofarecession, sothatin1988theactualfunds
rate is below what is prescribed by theTaylor-type rule. Inﬂation worries then
may have led the Greenspan Fed to tighten more in 1989, which suggests that
greater-than-policy-rule tightening in 1989 followed a somewhat looser pol-
icy of the previous year. Some support for this view emerges if we examine
the Greenbook inﬂation forecasts in the period leading to 1989. As shown
in Figure 2, for the period surrounding mid-to-late 1988 and early 1989, the
Greenbook inﬂation forecasts turned out to be too pessimistic.
Thesecondepisodeoccursin1995whentheactualfundsrateishigherthan
what is prescribed by the rule. The reasons for this greater-than-policy-rule
tightening are not very clear. Taylor (2005) notes this may reﬂect preemptive
policy tightening that began in 1994, whereas Rudebusch (2006) attributes it
to an inﬂation scare that occurred at the end of 1994 evidenced by a rapid
rise in long-term interest rates. Some limited support for the inﬂation scare
argument appears in Figure 2, which shows that beginning in 1994:3, the
Greebook inﬂation forecasts turned somewhat pessimistic about inﬂation.18
Finally, in 1998:4 the actual funds rate is below what is prescribed by
the policy rule. This is the period when the international ﬁnancial system
was rocked by the Russian default and the demise of the Long-Term Capital
Management (LTCM), which led the Greenspan Fed to lower interest rates.
Together, these episodes suggest that the particular Taylor rule estimated in
this article may not be considered a complete description of policy actions
taken by the Greenspan Fed.
18Another factor that explains the greater-than-policy tightening in 1995 and in 1996–1997, as
in some previous work that uses actual future inﬂation and the current vintage output gap measure,
is the remarkable increase in productivity and potential output. At the time, most economists did
not recognize these changes and, hence, may have overestimated the degree of utilization in product
and labor markets, which likely reﬂected in tighter policy. However, a visual check of Figures 1
and 2 suggests that productivity acceleration may not be relevant in explaining the greater-than-
policy tightening in 1995. As shown in Figure 1, real-time estimates of the output gap indicate far
less slack in the economy than what is suggested by its 2006-vintage-only data in the subperiod
following the year 1995. Similarly, the Greenbook forecasts become signiﬁcantly pessimistic only
in the years 1996–1997. Thus, these considerations suggest that while productivity acceleration
may be relevant in explaining the post-1995 greater-than-policy tightenings documented in some
previous work, its role in explaining the 1995 policy episode is in doubt.Y. P. Mehra and B. D. Minton: Taylor Rule and the Greenspan Era 249
3. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The main objective of this article is to investigate whether monetary policy
actions taken by the Greenspan Fed can be summarized by a Taylor rule.
Recent research highlights three aspects of the policy rule followed by the
Greenspan Fed; namely, the Greenspan Fed was forward looking, focused on
coreinﬂation, andsmoothedinterestrates. Theempiricalworkpresentedhere
supports the above-noted general characterization of the policy rule followed
by the Greenspan Fed.
UsingtheGreenbookinﬂationforecastsandreal-timeCongressionalBud-
get estimates of the output gap, this article reports evidence indicating that the
Greenspan Fed reacted strongly to expected inﬂation and relatively weakly
to the output gap. The evidence also indicates the Greenspan Fed smoothed
interestrates,thoughthedegreeofinterest-ratesmoothingexhibitedisconsid-
erably less than what is documented in previous research. The hypothesis that
the Greenspan Fed was focused on core CPI inﬂation receives some support,
as theTaylor rule based on the Greenbook forecasts of core CPI inﬂation does
produce slightly more accurate forecasts of the funds rate than the Taylor rule
that uses the Greenbook forecasts of headline CPI or GDP inﬂation.
This article ﬁnds that a Taylor rule estimated using the Greenbook core
CPI inﬂation forecasts and real-time Congressional Budget estimates of the
output gap predicts very well the actual path of the federal funds rate from
1987 to 2000. The Taylor rule estimated alternatively with the Greenbook
GDP inﬂation forecasts seems to do as well. However, there are few periods
when the Greenspan Fed is off the estimated rule, arising perhaps as a result
of the Federal Reserve response to special macroeconomic developments not
captured by the simple rule.
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